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     his article revisits the law of State responsibility to ask whether, rather 
than invoking self-defense, there is a better way to conceptualize a State’s 
violent engagement with a non-State actor1 located in the territory of an-
other State when the latter does not consent to foreign intervention and is 
itself unable or unwilling to stop the non-State actor from directing further 
attacks. In posing this question my intention should not be misinterpreted 
as one that seeks to identify a broader exception to the general prohibition 
on the use of force; in fact, it is quite the reverse. This article proposes a 
more legally coherent account of State practice that preserves an inter-State 
reading of self-defense. In that process, it offers an explanation for the re-
cent statements by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that seem to rule 
out the option of invoking self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter 
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1. The term “non-State actor” denotes any entity with the capacity to launch an 












against non-State actors.2 Although this stance by the ICJ has been criti-
cized for not corresponding with the recent practice of States, if Article 51 
cannot be invoked to justify the use of force against a non-State actor in 
the scenario described above, are there any existing laws which would per-
mit States to cross an international border lawfully?  
In Part II, I argue that there are good reasons for preserving the tradi-
tional reading of Article 51, which was designed exclusively to regulate rela-
tions among States. To support this position, I identify the inherent weak-
nesses (as well as the attendant risks) embedded in the views that have 
emerged in recent years to justify the use of force against non-State actors 
based in the territory of a State that is unable to prevent further attacks but 
is also unwilling to consent to the armed intervention by the State under 
attack.  
In Part III, I explore further the argument that favors extending Article 
51 to non-State actors to ask why the non-State actor’s geographical loca-
tion determines the applicability of the jus ad bellum. If the answer to this 
question is simply that the crossing of the border is game-changing, an ex-
planation of why this is so is warranted. If, on the other hand, there is no 
compelling reason why this should be so, it raises an important question as 
to whether self-defense is the most coherent legal framework within which 
to conceptualize the use of force against non-State actors. And if this in-
deed is the case, how might a border be lawfully crossed?  
In Part IV, I tentatively suggest that existing international law has the 
potential to provide a satisfactory legal framework within which to address 
these questions. In addition to the two codified exceptions to the prohibi-
tion on the use of force, there is a long tradition, demonstrated by con-
sistent State practice, that the wrongfulness of a use of force can be pre-
cluded in one, and possibly two, other exceptional circumstances found in 
customary international law. International law has long recognized the right 
of a State to consent to the intervention of foreign armed forces to assist it 
in maintaining its internal security. Where the intervention is consensual, 
                                                                                                                      
2. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory 
Opinion]; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 147 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities Judgment]. But see also 
Judge Kooijmans’ Separate Opinion, ¶¶ 31–35, and Judge Simma’s Separate Opinion, ¶¶ 













there is no violation of Article 2(4).3 A second principle of international law 
that precludes the wrongfulness of an act that would otherwise be consid-
ered a violation of the law is the plea of necessity. I suggest that it is this 
customary international law principle that provides a far more coherent 
basis upon which to justify the use of force against the non-State actor lo-
cated in the territory of another State that is unwilling to prevent further 
attacks.  
I conclude by arguing that the conditions attached to necessity function 
to severely restrict its availability, more so than self-defense. Thus, the crit-
ics of current State targeting policy with respect to the members of orga-
nized armed groups (OAGs) in foreign territories are no more likely to be 
convinced on the facts that a robust case of necessity has been made out. 
However, by contrast to self-defense, invoking necessity to justify the use 
of force against an OAG in the territory of another State enables that State 
to cross a border lawfully if the requisite conditions are satisfied. For the 
State claiming the right to use force in such circumstances, there are further 
legal hurdles thrown up by jus in bello that must be overcome before its 
conduct is considered lawful.  
 
II. SEVERING THE LINK BETWEEN STATE ATTRIBUTION  
FOR AN ARMED ATTACK 
 
Constituted in the aftermath of the Second World War, the primary ambi-
tion of the United Nations Charter system, as exemplified by Article 2(4), 
was to prevent future war between States.4 The contemporary law on the 
use of force is founded on the now customary international law prohibi-
tion5 set forth in the Article, which states: “All members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integri-
                                                                                                                      
3. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 114 (1991). 
Consent functions to negate what is otherwise a wrongdoing.  
4. The Preamble of the Charter opens with the declaration,  
 
We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, . . . 
and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as 
good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, 
and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed 
force shall not be used, save in the common interest, . . . have resolved to combine our ef-
forts to accomplish these aims. 
    
5. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 












ty or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.”6 
The negotiating history of the Charter reveals that Article 2(4) was “in-
tended to be a comprehensive prohibition on the use of force by one State 
against the other”7 and, as the text makes clear, the provision was only 
concerned with inter-State uses of force. The Charter recognizes two ex-
ceptions to this prohibition: enforcement actions as provided under Arti-
cles 39, 41 and 42; and the right of individual and collective self-defense, 
codified in Article 51. A decision by the Security Council to authorize the 
use of armed force under Article 42 is conditioned on a prior determina-
tion by the Council as to the existence of a “threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression” (Article 39).8 While an act of aggression by 
definition can only be committed by States,9 there is nothing to preclude the 
former two situations arising as a consequence of violence by non-State 
actors.10 In fact there is considerable State practice to show that civil war 
situations, particularly where there are trans-boundary effects, have often 
been determined as amounting to “a threat to the peace.”11  
Article 51, on the other hand, has traditionally been regarded as an in-
ter-State right that could be invoked only in the event of “an armed attack” 
by another State. More specifically, the article provides, “Nothing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
tions.” Although this provision was not intended to preclude armed attacks 
by non-State actors that were acting on behalf of a State, what the Charter 
regime did not foresee was the prospect of an “armed attack” by a non-
                                                                                                                      
6. U.N. Charter art.2, para. 4. 
7. Sean Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter, 43 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 41 (2002). 
8. Article 41 is concerned with measures not involving the use of armed force that 
may be used to enforce a Security Council decision. 
9. Declaration on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).  
10. As the commentary to Rule 18 of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Appli-
cable to Cyber Warfare notes, the Security Council has also “labelled two significant phenom-
ena as threats to the peace”—international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN 
MANUAL]. 
11. S.C. Res. 1973, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1527, 
pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1527 (Feb. 4, 2004); S.C. Res. 1484, pmbl., U.N. Doc. 













State actor acting without (or with minimal) State involvement. This was 
most probably because there was an assumption that armed attacks by such 
actors on the scale and gravity envisaged by Article 51 would necessarily in-
volve a State. The attacks on 9/11 challenged that assumption, prompting a 
fundamental rethinking of the law on the use of force.   
Three views now dominate the discourse on the applicability of Article 
51 to armed attacks by non-State actors. The first insists on the preserva-
tion of a strong link between the non-State actor that launches an armed 
attack and a State (typically the territorial State from which such an attack is 
launched).  In other words, Article 51 may only be invoked in situations 
where there is “substantial involvement” by a State in the armed attack car-
ried out by the non-State actor. The second view attempts to extend to vic-
tim States a remedy in situations where there is little or no evidence of the 
territorial State’s involvement in the armed attack although it has allowed 
its territory to be used a base from which the non-State actor is able to 
mount such an attack. Advocates of this view maintain that under such cir-
cumstances a victim State should be entitled to use force pursuant to Arti-
cle 51 against the State that harbors or gives sanctuary to the non-State ac-
tor. Proponents of the third view simply claim that Article 51 applies to 
armed attacks by non-State actors. According to this view, the State from 
which the attack has been facilitated cannot claim that its territorial integri-
ty or sovereignty has been violated if the victim State uses force in self-
defense as long as the principle of necessity is strictly adhered to. Each of 
these views warrants further comment since there are inherent problems 
associated with all three.  
Although the traditional view of Article 51 is founded on an inter-State 
conception of the right to use force, this stance has never absolutely pre-
cluded the applicability of the right of the victim State to use force in re-
sponse to an armed attack by a non-State actor where there is “substantial 
involvement” by a State in that attack. This latter point was elaborated by 
the ICJ in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua judgment) when it was required to consider whether 
acts committed by the contras in the course of their military operations in 
Nicaragua could be attributed to the United States.12 In that case the ICJ 
noted that “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregular or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against anoth-
er State . . . or its substantial involvement therein” could amount to an 
                                                                                                                      












armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 if the operation, because of 
its “scale and effects,” would have been classified as an armed attack had it 
been carried out by regular armed forces of the State.13 In other words, alt-
hough force could be used pursuant to Article 51 in the event of an armed 
attack by non-State actors, the right to do so was preconditioned on the 
involvement of a State in that attack. The pivotal question turned on what 
degree of involvement by a State was necessary to enable a victim State to in-
voke self-defense.14 According to the ICJ, the standard was high. For the 
conduct of irregular forces to give rise to legal responsibility on the part of 
the State, the non-State actor must have been in a relationship of “com-
plete dependence”15 or under the direction or “effective control” of a 
State.16 Insofar as the ICJ was concerned, “general control” by the State or 
even a “high degree of dependency,” including the financing, organizing, 
training, supplying or equipping of the non-State actor, did not suffice.17  
The customary international law test for attributing the wrongful acts 
of non-State actors to a State is set forth in Article 8 of the International 
                                                                                                                      
13. Id., ¶ 195. 
14. According to Judge Schwebel, a State must at least exercise significant, perhaps 
determinative, influence over the non-State actor’s decision making, as well as play a 
meaningful role in the specific operations before an armed attack will be imputed to it. Id., 
¶ 6 (separate opinion of Judge Schwebel).  
15. In the Nicaragua judgment, the ICJ concluded there was insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate the contras’ complete dependence on the United States and therefore it was 
unable to determine that the contra force could equated for legal purposes with the forces 
of the United States. Id., ¶¶ 109–10. In the Genocide case, the ICJ upheld the “complete 
dependence” test and explained,  
 
[I]t is appropriate to look beyond legal status alone, in order to grasp the reality of the re-
lationship between the person taking action, and the State to which he is so closely at-
tached as to appear to be nothing more than its agent: any other solution would allow 
States to escape their international responsibility by choosing to act through persons or 
entities whose supposed independence would be purely fictitious. However, so to equate 
persons or entities with State organs when they do not have that status under internal law 
must be exceptional, for it requires proof of a particularly great degree of State control 
over them.  
 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 108, ¶¶ 392–93 (Feb. 26) [herein-
after Genocide Case].   
16. Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 5, ¶ 115. As elaborated by the ICJ in the Genocide 
case, the “complete dependence” test is fundamentally distinguishable on the basis that 
the non-State actor cannot be considered other than a de facto State organ and so “all [its] 
actions performed in such capacity would be attributable to the State for purposes of in-
ternational responsibility.” Genocide Case, supra note 15, ¶ 397.  













Law Commission’s (ILC’s) Articles on State Responsibility.18 Partially rely-
ing on the Nicaragua judgment, Article 8 provides that “[t]he conduct of a 
person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under in-
ternational law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying 
out the conduct.”19 As the ILC notes, it is widely accepted in international 
jurisprudence that responsibility attaches to a State for the wrongful acts of 
non-State actors if the former has authorized the acts in question; thus, if, 
on the specific instructions of a State, a non-State actor launches an armed 
attack on another State, the State that issued the instructions will be held 
responsible for the wrongful conduct.20 It follows that since the State 
which instructs the non-State actor to commit the wrongful act is legally 
responsible for the commission of that act, if the act amounts to an “armed 
attack,” the victim State is entitled to respond in self-defense against the 
State despite the fact that the actual attack may have been carried out by 
the non-State actor. The more difficult cases are armed attacks that are os-
tensibly carried out “under the direction or control” of a State. But as the 
ILC suggests, “such conduct will be attributable to the State only if it di-
rected or controlled the specific operation and the conduct complained of 
[i.e., the armed attack] was an integral part of that operation.”21 According-
ly, if a State has effective control over the non-State actor’s military opera-
tion which is of such “scale and effects” that it cannot be classed as any-
thing but an armed attack (as in the case of specific instructions) the victim 
State is entitled to resort to force in self-defense against that State although 
the attack itself may have been carried out by the non-State actor. In that 
the majority in the ICJ’s 2004 advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories appeared to fore-
close the possibility that an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 
                                                                                                                      
18. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 110 (2002). The 
standard set forth in Article 8 relied on the test of attribution identified by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua judgment. The conduct of non-State actors may also be attributed to a State 
under Article 11 if the State “acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its 
own.”    
19. See also Genocide Case, supra note 15, ¶¶ 398, 406. 
20. See Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 5, ¶ 195; Armed Activities Judgment, supra 
note 2, ¶ 146. See also U.N. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. 
GAOR, 6th Comm, 29th sess., 2319th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 
14, 1974).  












can originate from a non-State actor, the judgment is problematic, not least 
since such a scenario was expressly recognized in the Nicaragua judgment.22 
Nor can this stance be reconciled with State practice. Nevertheless, even 
the more fluid Nicaragua test has engendered its own set of problems be-
cause it insists on a direct correlation between the jus ad bellum and State 
responsibility legal regimes.23  
The consequence of this is that the traditional inter-State approach fails 
to adequately provide a meaningful remedy for States that are subject to 
armed attacks by non-State actors in situations where: (1) there is inade-
quate proof to show that there is substantial involvement of a State in the 
attack; and (2), there is little or no involvement by a State in the armed at-
tack although the State from where the attack was conducted allowed its 
territory to be used by the non-State actor.24 The ICJ’s faithful application 
of the test of attribution elaborated in the Nicaragua judgment to the facts 
before it in the case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Armed Activities judgment) meant the ICJ could not but reject Uganda’s 
claim that it had acted in self-defense.25 With “no satisfactory proof” of the 
involvement of the Democratic Republic of Congo in the “armed attacks” 
by the rebel forces, Uganda was precluded from invoking Article 51, leav-
ing it with no satisfactory remedy apart from countermeasures—in other 
words, measures short of force.26 Although the traditionalists recognize 
that the State that allows its territory to be used by such groups is in viola-
tion of its customary international law obligations,27 the best answer they 
                                                                                                                      
22. Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, ¶ 139. 
23. For useful analysis, see Nicholas Tsagourias, Necessity and the Use of Force: A Special 
Regime, 41 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (2010). 
24. SCHACHTER, supra note 3, at 169. 
25. Armed Activities Case, supra note 2, ¶¶ 146–47. But see also Separate Opinion of 
Judge Kooijmans, ¶¶ 29–30, and Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, ¶ 12. 
26. In the Oil Platforms judgment, Judge Simma took the position that proportionate 
countermeasures could involve a limited degree of military force in response to circum-
stances below the Article 51 threshold of “armed attack.” Separate Opinion of Judge 
Simma, Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 12–13 (Nov. 6). Rosalyn Higgins, 
A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench, 55 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARA-
TIVE LAW QUARTERLY 795 (2006).  
27. In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ held that every State is obliged “not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states.” Corfu 
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, ¶ 22 (Apr. 9). See also paragraph 4 of the Declaration 
on Friendly Relations. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 













can offer is to point to countermeasures and/or the law enforcement para-
digm. But what they cannot do is to resolve the situation in which the terri-
torial State that harbors the non-State actor is unwilling to prevent further 
attacks let alone detain, extradite or even prosecute such actors.28    
This legal lacuna has been widely debated in legal journals since the 
1980s prompting some to argue for a far more expansive interpretation of 
Article 51 than that set out in the Nicaragua judgment.29 Proponents of this 
second view suggest that the State that harbors or allows its territory to be 
used by the non-State actor which engages in an armed attack is equally 
responsible for that wrongful act.30 While this view has garnered far more 
support in the post-9/11 period, State practice prior to that point indicates 
that a narrow inter-State reading of self-defense prevailed.31 Repeated at-
tempts to extend the right of self-defense to encompass harboring (often 
equated to aiding and abetting)32 the non-State actor were generally treated 
as inadequate bases upon which to claim the lawful use of force in self-
defense. For example, in spite of Israel’s assertion that “a country cannot 
claim the protection of sovereignty when it knowingly offers a piece of its 
territory for terrorist activity against other nations,” its 1985 attack on the 
                                                                                                                      
Doc. A/8082 (1970). In the Armed Activities judgment the ICJ held General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 declaratory of customary international law and that “no State shall organ-
ize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities di-
rected towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil 
strife in another State.” Armed Activities Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 162. See also S.C. Res. 
1373, U.N. Doc S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
28. Since the early days of the U.N. Charter, commentators have cautioned that any 
law “which prohibits resort to force without providing a legitimate claimant with adequate 
alternative means of obtaining redress, contains the seeds of trouble.” C.H.M. Waldock, 
The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES 
COURS (Hague Academy of International Law) 455 (II-1952)  
29. Abraham Sofaer, Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terror-
ism, the Law and the National Defense, 126 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 89 (1989); Ruth Wedg-
wood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 559 (1999). 
30. A further problematic aspect of this view is that proponents sometimes refer to 
the State that harbors the non-State actor while others talk of the State from whose terri-
tory an attack is launched.  
31. See generally Tom Ruys & Sten Verhoeven, Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of 
Self-Defence, 10 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 289–320 (2005).  
32. For a discussion on the flaws of equating “harboring” with the criminal law con-
cept of “aiding and abetting,” see Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: 













headquarters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Tunisia on the 
grounds that it was acting pursuant to Article 51 was rejected by the Securi-
ty Council, with the United States abstaining.33 What is more, none of the 
members of the Council appeared persuaded by the U.S. contention that 
“an aspect of the inherent right of self-defense recognized in the United 
Nations Charter [is that] a State subject to continuing terrorist attacks may 
respond with appropriate use of force to defend itself against further at-
tacks.”34 Similarly, the U.S. strikes at sites in Afghanistan and Sudan in Au-
gust 1998 following the Al Qaeda bombings of the American embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania as justified exercises of self-defense received mixed 
reactions.35 Caution is nevertheless required before reaching any conclusion 
as to the scope of the law since the reaction of States to many of these in-
cidents during this period were clearly framed by political alignments. That 
said, State practice did not appear to deviate much from the interpretation 
of self-defense elaborated by the ICJ in the Nicaragua judgment.  
Proponents of the second view nevertheless point to the conduct of 
States in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 as having fundamentally altered 
the traditional conception of Article 51. Security Council Resolutions 1368 
(2001) and 1373 (2001) and subsequent State practice are cited as evidence 
for the emergence of an instant customary international law right favoring 
an expansive interpretation of self-defense.36 Those who have long pressed 
for such an approach recall the widespread international support for Oper-
ation Enduring Freedom, which was launched in (and against) Afghanistan 
on the basis that the threat posed by Al Qaeda was “made possible by the 
decision of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it con-
                                                                                                                      
33. For the exchanges between States, see U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/PV.2615 (Oct. 4, 1985).  
34. Id. 
35. See letter dated 20 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United 
States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Coun-
cil invoking Article 51. U.N. Doc. S/1998/780 (Aug. 20, 1998). Britain, Germany, Austral-
ia, New Zealand and Israel supported the military operations; France and Italy were 
equivocal, while Russia, China, Pakistan, several Arab States and the Non-Aligned Move-
ment were critical.  
36. On the question of whether the case of Afghanistan represented the formation of 
instant custom or whether it ought to be regarded as an exception, see Antonio Cassese, 
Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 997 (2001); Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the 













trols to be used by this organization as a base of operation.”37 Nevertheless, 
even supporters of the military action have conceded that justifying the use 
of force against Afghanistan is “a difficult question.”38  
State practice in the decade since 9/11 is marked by a certain degree of 
ambiguity.39 For example, although the international community criticized 
Israel’s use of force during its 2006 conflict with Hezbollah as being dis-
proportionate, many supported its right to use force in self-defense.40 Yet 
the issue over which there was palpable unease was whether such force 
could lawfully be used in Lebanon without violating its territorial sovereign-
ty, not least because there was a belief that Iran and Syria, rather than Leb-
anon, were facilitating Hezbollah’s military operations.41 Although a majori-
ty of experts agree that mere harboring (or indeed the failure of a State to 
                                                                                                                      
37. Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United 
States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Coun-
cil. U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001). The UK also justified its military action in Af-
ghanistan under Article 51 on the grounds that the Taliban regime was “supporting” Al 
Qaeda. U.N. Doc. S/2001/947 (Oct. 7, 2001).  
38. CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Af-
ghanistan, Al-Qaida and Iraq, in ESSAYS ON WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 684, 686 (2006). 
Greenwood dismisses the objections on the basis that “the criteria for determining the 
responsibility of a State for the acts of a private organisation are not altogether clear” and 
that since Afghanistan was in violation of international law in permitting Al Qaeda to op-
erate from its territory, this “exposed its own forces to lawful attack in exercise of the right 
of self-defence.” 
39. Article 1(c)(xi) of the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence 
Pact, 2005, defines aggression to include “the encouragement, support, harbouring or 
provision of any assistance for the commission of terrorist acts and other violent trans-
national organized crimes against a Member State.” See also Article 1(3)(k) of the 2006 
Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region. 
40. For example, the UN Secretary-General stated, “While Hizbollah’s actions are de-
plorable and, as I have said, Israel has a right to defend itself, the excessive use of force is 
to be condemned.” U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5492nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5492 (July 20, 
2006). 
41. See Identical Letters dated 12 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Is-
rael to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the 
Security Council, which read, “Responsibility for this belligerent act of war lies with the 
Government of Lebanon, from whose territory these acts have been launched into Israel. 
Responsibility also lies with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syri-
an Arab Republic, which support and embrace those who carried out this attack.” U.N. 
Doc. A/60/937-S/2006/515 (July 12, 2006). Revealingly, in his briefing to the Security 
Council the UN Secretary-General emphasized that “any analogy with Afghanistan under 
the Taliban is wholly misleading.” U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5492nd mtg., U.N. Doc. 












police its territory to prevent the launch of attacks) is insufficient to attrib-
ute the actions of non-State actors to the State for the purpose of finding a 
use of force by that State, many also share the view that the provision of 
sanctuary coupled with other acts, such as substantial support for the non-
State group, could, in certain circumstances, be considered a use of force.42 
Advocates of the second view are not insensitive to the inherent risks asso-
ciated with their position, since lowering the threshold of attribution neces-
sarily increases the possibility of armed conflict.43 But the case of Lebanon 
also exposes a far more problematic aspect of the second view in that the 
reasoning upon which self-defense rests is implicitly being reconfigured. 
As an exceptional measure of self-help, self-defense is traditionally un-
derstood to operate to negate an otherwise wrongful act (the use of force 
by the victim State) in response to a prior wrongdoing (an armed attack) 
for the purpose of preventing further wrongdoing (attacks) by the perpetra-
tor of the original wrong. Structurally, the plea regulates the conduct be-
tween two parties: the aggressor and the victim of that aggression. Addi-
tionally, it implicitly introduces a temporal limitation on the use of force in 
that once the aggressor no longer has the ability to conduct armed attacks, 
there is no further need—and by implication, requirement—for the victim 
to use defensive force. In its revised form, self-defense is being stretched to 
breaking point on both counts. Insofar as the temporal limitation is con-
cerned, it is difficult to identify at what point the victim State need no 
longer use defensive force since self-defense was invoked against the party 
that was not directly responsible for the original armed attack.44 Second, on 
this reading, self-defense is required to negate an otherwise wrongful use of 
force against the State that harbors the non-State actor, rather than against 
the perpetrator of the armed attack. The only way to resolve this incongruity is 
to accept, as some claim, that no distinction should be drawn between the 
two.45 There will of course be some cases when the State from whose terri-
                                                                                                                      
42. See Definition of Use of Force, TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 10, commentary to 
Rule 11, ¶ 5.  
43. See Claus Kress, Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing Trans-
national Armed Conflicts, 15 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 245, 247–251 
(2010). 
44. Does defensive force end when the non-State actor is no longer able to conduct 
attacks from the territory of that particular State or from any other, or when the State no 
longer harbors such actors?  
45. See, for example, the United States’ National Security Strategy (Sept. 2002) and the 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 













tory the attack has been launched has played an active role in facilitating 
the attack; however, that will not always be the case, as was aptly demon-
strated by the Lebanon example. The unease associated with this bind of-
ten translates into public statements by those claiming self-defense to em-
phasize that the use of force is directed not at the territorial State but the 
offending non-State actor. This unsatisfactory situation has thus given rise 
to a third view that calls for Article 51 to be extended to armed attacks by 
non-State actors. 
 According to this view, a victim State should be entitled to resort to 
defensive force against a non-State actor as long as the Nicaragua “scale and 
effects” test is satisfied.46 The fractious attribution question is thereby 
completely by-passed since there is no need to attribute the armed attack to 
any State, including the one from which the armed attack was launched.47 
In support of this view proponents point to State practice in the immediate 
wake of 9/11 which recognized the inherent right of States to use defen-
sive force in response to attacks by non-State actors.48 This view is further 
strengthened by the silence in the primary legal texts, which make no ex-
press reference to an armed attack having to originate from a State,49 a con-
                                                                                                                      
House of Lords on April 21, 2004 stated, “[F]orce might, in certain circumstances, be used 
in self-defence against those who plan and perpetrate [terrorist] acts and against those 
harbouring them, if that is necessary to avert further such terrorist acts.” 21 Apr. 2004, 
PARL. DEB., H.L. (2004) 356 (Lord Thomas of Gresford, statement opening the debate 
on international self-defense), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ 
ldhansrd/vo040421/text/40421-07.htm. 
46. It should be noted that there is a tendency among proponents of this view to con-
flate the jus ad bellum with the jus in bello rules; for example, the jus ad bellum “scale and ef-
fects” test is often equated to the jus in bello “intensity” threshold. Kress, supra note 43.    
47. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 206–8 (4th ed. 
2005); Murphy, supra note 7; Ken Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We 
Came to Debate Whether There Is a “Legal Geography of War” 7 (WCL Research Paper No. 
2011-16, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract+1824783 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).  
48. As with the second view, evidence cited includes Security Council Resolutions 
1368 and 1373 and NATO’s invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which 
states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America 
“shall be considered an attack against them all.” North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 
63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official 
_texts_17120.htm [hereinafter Washington Treaty]. 
49. This evidence is not as equivocal as advocates maintain. For example, Article 3(1) 
of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance states that the High Contract-
ing Parties  
 
agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as 












sideration that did not go unnoticed by some of the ICJ judges in the Wall 
advisory opinion and in the Armed Activities judgment.50  
The right to use defensive force against a non-State actor pursuant to 
Article 51 is tempered by the principles of necessity, proportionality, and 
imminence of the attack. The principle of necessity is required to play a far 
more prominent role in the context of defensive force against non-State 
actors than it does in the case of inter-State defensive force. This is so in 
two respects. First, embedded in the inter-State conception of defensive 
force is a fidelity to the territorial border, which functions to confine the 
force that may be deployed to specific geographical locations. This is 
achieved through the implicit recognition that when inter-State force is 
used, the territories of States not party to the conflict remain undisturbed, 
protected by the principle of territorial sovereignty. Extending self-defense 
to non-State actors severs the link with this geographical constraint (for the 
simple reason that the non-State actor is not defined by any territorial at-
tributes), introducing the prospect of borderless wars. The principle of ne-
cessity performs a critical role by reintroducing a spatial limitation to self-
defense, insisting that it is only if the State that harbors is unwilling or una-
ble to respond in an appropriate manner to prevent further attacks that 
defensive force is lawful. Second, it would appear that the principle of ne-
cessity functions to preclude the territorial State from insisting that its terri-
torial sovereignty be respected, possibly on the basis that it is in violation 
of its international obligation not to allow its territory to be used as a base 
from which attacks can be conducted.   
To extend Article 51 to armed attacks by non-State actors seems to of-
fer a simple solution insofar as the relationship between the non-State actor 
and the State that is the target of the armed attack is concerned. However, 
this view raises a number of derivative questions. Why does the geograph-
                                                                                                                      
ing Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Between the United States of America 
and Other American Republics, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, 21 U.N.T.S. 77, available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/70681.htm. However, neither Article 51 of the UN 
Charter nor Article 5 of the Washington Treaty includes an express reference to States, 
with the latter merely providing that “an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”   Washington 
Treaty, supra note 48.   
50. See, e.g., Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, ¶ 













ical location of the non-State actor determine whether or not the State 
must justify its use of force? Should the location of the non-State actor de-
termine the legal relationship between it and the State? 
 
III. CROSSING THE BORDER 
 
That States have willingly consented to limit their right to use force in ac-
cordance with the jus ad bellum does not impinge or alter in any manner the 
premise that the legitimate use of force rests exclusively with the State.51 
Nor has the acceptance for greater international regulation of the violence 
between State and non-State actors had any bearing on the fact that it is 
only the State that is entitled to lawfully resort to force. The right to use 
force thus continues to be jealously guarded by States as a sovereign pre-
rogative recognized by international law and enforced in accordance with 
domestic law. To the extent that non-State actors engage in unauthorized 
violence within a State (in other words, violence without the lawful authori-
ty of the State) they will be treated as criminals under domestic law regard-
less of whether the situation of violence amounts to an armed conflict.52 It 
is the fact that the non-State actor has taken up arms without lawful State 
authority that extends to the State the right to use force to suppress the 
violence. The degree of force that may be wielded by the State is context 
dependent and contingent on what legal regime applies in the circumstanc-
es. Experts may disagree on what level of force is appropriate in any given 
situation (whether the force is proportionate) but the issue over which 
there is no disagreement is that the territorial State is not required to justify 
its use of force whether as a law enforcement exercise in peacetime or a mil-
itary operation in an armed conflict situation. In neither case is Article 51 
relevant.53 
As already noted, self-defense is an exceptional right raised by a State 
to justify its use of force. It is therefore somewhat incongruous that a State 
should be required to justify its use of force against a non-State actor that has 
                                                                                                                      
51. Max Weber defined a State as “a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Max Weber, Politics as 
Vocation, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78 (2001). 
52. All States have legal frameworks which privilege their own police and armed forc-
es over insurgents who oppose them. Dieter Fleck, The Law of Non-international Armed Con-
flicts, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ¶ 1202.2 
(Dieter Fleck & Terry D. Gill eds., 2008).  












engaged in violent activities directed against that State merely because the 
non-State actor is located on the territory of another State when no such 
justification would be expected were that same non-State actor to be locat-
ed within the State’s own territory. Dinstein’s explanation for this is that 
“an armed attack against a State, in the meaning of Article 51, posits some 
element external to the victim State. Non-State actors must strike at a State 
from the outside.”54 Yet this still does not fully explain why the location of 
the non-State actor, or the crossing of a border, fundamentally alters a pre-
existing relationship. This may account for the ambiguity that surrounds 
State practice, which is overshadowed by a deep-seated disquiet insofar as 
justifying the use of force against a non-State actor is concerned. The ques-
tion that cannot be avoided is whether the geographical location of the 
non-State actor should, as a matter of law, alter the legal relationship be-
tween the State and non-State actor, let alone determine the applicability of 
the jus ad bellum. To answer in the affirmative is evocative of the claim held 
not long ago that the location of an armed conflict determines the classifi-
cation of that conflict, revealing, if nothing else, the extent to which geog-
raphy frames perceptions.  
If there is no compelling reason why the non-State actor’s location 
should be determinative, self-defense may not necessarily be the most co-
herent legal framework within which to conceptualize the use of force 
against such actors. If this is indeed the case, how might a border be law-
fully crossed by a State without violating the territorial sovereignty of the 
State in which force is deployed? History is replete with examples of non-
State actors attacking States from the territory of another State. The capaci-
ty of such actors to “wage war” against a State may have increased but the 
problem is not new. Did the Charter create a normative framework leaving 
States with no remedy? Is there a legal vacuum that must be filled? 
The UN Charter may have introduced a legal regime which codified 
two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force, but there is a long 
tradition, demonstrated by consistent State practice, that the wrongfulness 
of a use of force can be precluded in one, and possibly other exceptional 
circumstances found in customary international law. In the event that the 
territorial State is unable to prevent further attacks from its territory, inter-
national law does not prohibit it from inviting foreign forces onto its terri-
tory to stop the attacks,55 as long as the consent is regarded as “valid” and 
                                                                                                                      
54. Id. at 204–5. 
55. The question of what legal regime applies to the foreign armed forces is a separate 













does not involve the violation of a peremptory norm. This principle is set 
forth in Article 20 of the Articles on State Responsibility. 
As already noted, primary legal responsibility for prevention resides with 
the State from which such attacks have been conducted.56 Nevertheless, in 
situations where the territorial State is unable to prevent further attacks yet 
is unwilling to consent to foreign intervention, the customary international 
law plea of necessity, I suggest, provides a far more coherent basis upon 
which to justify the use of force rather than self-defense. Such a suggestion 
is likely to court considerable criticism and resistance not least because ne-
cessity often arouses great angst. The unease is not without foundation 
since all exceptions threaten the rule.57 Nevertheless, the concern that “in 
practice and over time the threshold for necessity will atrophy or ‘soften’”58 
is one that is perhaps overstated and should not serve as the basis for re-
jecting a more lucid approach to the law. That a normative gap in respect 
of non-State actors was created by the UN Charter regime is unsurprising 
since the objective of the drafters was to design a legal framework to regu-
late the relations between States. Attempts to remedy the gap in the law 
have to date focused on Article 51 but, as discussed above, there are intrin-
sic problems with each of the proposals suggested. Rather than stretching 
Article 51 beyond recognition, necessity, as set forth in Article 25 of the 
Articles on State Responsibility, may offer a better option in that it has the 
capacity to fill the void on a far more robust footing. 
 
IV. THE PLEA OF NECESSITY 
 
Despite the evidence supporting the customary international law plea of a 
“state of necessity” there has been little discussion as to its potential rele-
vance and value in resolving the current legal quandaries facing States in 
their violent exchanges with non-State actors located in another State. 
                                                                                                                      
56. The nature of the attack may, however, alter this assumption. A more coherent 
view mandates that it is not the territory from which an attack is launched but the territory 
in which the non-State actor that is responsible for the attack is situated that matters.   
57. As Crawford observes, “[T]he commentary admits that scholarly opinion on the 
plea of necessity is sharply divided, suggesting that a further reason for this was the earlier 
tendency to abuse the doctrine of necessity to cover cases of aggression, annexation or 
military occupation.” James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on State Re-
sponsibility, ¶ 278, Int’l L. Comm’n, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/498/Add.2 (Apr. 30, 
1999) [hereinafter Crawford Second Report]. 
58. Robert Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility, 106 












Those who have entertained the possible relevance of the plea are quick to 
dismiss it as not applicable to situations that involve the use of force, alt-
hough this view is not shared by all.59 Simply put, necessity denotes a situa-
tion in which a State whose sole means of safeguarding an essential interest 
adopts conduct not in conformity with what is required of it by an interna-
tional obligation to another State. But because the harm it faces is immi-
nent and serious, along with the fact that any other course of conduct is 
likely to result in even more serious consequences, no State responsibility is 
incurred for the violation. Although not commonly invoked, the customary 
status of necessity was expressly recognized by the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project case when, after having carefully weighed the submissions 
by the parties and in light of the reports by the ILC, the ICJ held that “the 
state of necessity is a ground recognized by customary international law for 
precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an interna-
tional obligation.”60 Similarly, in the Wall advisory opinion, the ICJ consid-
ered “whether Israel could rely on a state of necessity, which would pre-
clude the wrongfulness of the construction of the wall,” but dismissed its 
applicability on the facts as it was not convinced that “the construction of 
the wall along the route chosen was the only means to safeguard the inter-
est of Israel against the peril which it has invoked as justification for that 
construction.”61  
The plea of necessity is one among six circumstances identified by the 
ILC as precluding the wrongfulness of an otherwise unlawful act.62 The 
ILC’s decision to adopt a negative wording in defining the scope and con-
tent of necessity reveals its intention to underscore the exceptional nature 
of the plea. Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility states: 
 
1.  Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international 
obligation of that State unless the act: 
 
                                                                                                                      
59. While the majority of scholars have questioned the applicability of necessity as a 
plea involving uses of force, some have questioned the customary international law status 
of necessity as elaborated by the International Law Commission. See, e.g., id.  
60. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slov.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 51 (Sept. 25).  
61. Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, ¶ 140. 
62. See CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 160–89. The five other circumstances are con-
sent (Article 20), self-defense (Article 21), countermeasures (Article 22), force majeure (Arti-













(a)  is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril; and 
 
(b)  does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or 
States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international 
community as a whole. 
 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for 
precluding wrongfulness if: 
 
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of 
invoking necessity; or 
 
(b)  the State has contributed to the situation of necessity. 
 
The most compelling reason for preferring necessity over self-defense 
as a basis for justifying the use of force against a non-State actor is that, in 
contrast to self-defense, necessity is not dependent on a prior wrongdoing 
by the State acted against.63 This aspect of the plea makes it particularly rel-
evant in situations where there is little or no evidence to suggest that a 
State has been involved in an armed attack by a non-State actor. In contrast 
to Article 51, which leaves the victim State with no lawful option involving 
the use of defensive force, necessity would function to preclude responsi-
bility for what would otherwise be a wrongful use of force by the victim 
State that is totally independent of the conduct adopted by the territorial State. 
In other words, necessity introduces the possibility of extending a lawful 
remedy to the victim State of an armed attack by a non-State actor without 
requiring it to attribute the wrongdoing to another State (including the ter-
                                                                                                                      
63. The commentary to Article 33 on the State of Necessity to the ILC’s 1980 report 
states, “[T]he wrongfulness of an act committed in a state of necessity is not precluded by 
the pre-existence . . . of a particular course of conduct by the State acted against.” Rep of 
the Int’l Law Comm’n, 32nd sess, May 5–July 25, 1980, UN GAOR 35th Sess., Supp. No. 
10, at 34, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Report of the ILC]. The 
commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility likewise states, “Unlike consent 
(art. 20), self-defence (art. 21) or countermeasures (art. 22), [necessity] is not dependent on 
the prior conduct of the injured State.”  Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for In-
ternationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. of the Int'l L. Comm'n, 53d Sess., U.N. GAOR 56th 
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 178, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEAR-
BOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 26, U.N. Doc. 













ritorial State from where the attack originates) in circumstances where there 
is clearly no such involvement on the part of a State in the attack. Since the 
victim State is likely to take the forcible measures it deems are necessary to 
defend its interests, it is simply a farce to leave it with no option but to pre-
sent a case pursuant to Article 51 founded on contorted reasoning and du-
bious evidence linking the attack to the territorial State. By contrast, neces-
sity would allow for a far more principled approach governed by law because a 
separation can be maintained between the wrongdoing perpetrated by the 
non-State actor and the relationship between the State deploying force and 
the territorial State in which such force is used.  
For example, although Turkey did not expressly claim that its use of 
force in Iraq against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 1995 was justi-
fied by reason of necessity, its submissions to the Security Council justify-
ing force were more redolent of necessity than self-defense in that Turkey 
made no effort to link its use of force to a prior wrongdoing on the part of 
Iraq. In fact the opposite was the case. During the course of its military 
operations against the PKK, which had established a number of bases 
within Iraq, Turkey emphasized that it had “always attributed utmost im-
portance to the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Iraq, a country with which it maintained close political and economic rela-
tions, emanating from a common historical background.” Despite the 
mounting criticism and Libya’s accusation that Turkey’s incursion into Iraq 
was an act of aggression, it did not recall Article 51 as the United States had 
done on its behalf.64  Instead, Turkey maintained that it could not “ask the 
Government of Iraq to fulfill its obligations, under international law, to 
prevent the use of its territory for the staging of terrorist acts against Tur-
key” since, due to the existing no-fly zone which had been imposed since 
1991, Iraq was unable to exercise authority over the northern part of its 
country. Insofar as Turkey was concerned, it was “resorting to legitimate 
measures” against attacks by non-State actors to safeguard its own security 
which, in the particular circumstances, could not be regarded as a violation 
of Iraq’s sovereignty.65 Whether Turkey’s military operations satisfied the 
requisite conditions of necessity is a wholly separate question that is dis-
cussed below.  
                                                                                                                      
64. Letter dated 12 July 1995 from the Charge d’Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mis-
sion of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/566 (July 
12, 1995).  
65. Letter dated 24 July 1995 from the Charge d’Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mis-













State practice in which the plea of necessity involving a use of force has 
been invoked is admittedly sparse. The leading pre-Charter case is the Caro-
line incident of 1837. Although frequently cited as an example of self-
defense, close scrutiny of the exchanges between the UK and United States 
indicate that the case centered on the plea of necessity in a pre–jus ad bellum 
environment. For its part, the UK was adamant that its use of armed force 
on U.S. territory directed at non-State actors who were assisting the Cana-
dian insurgents was lawful. The destruction of the Caroline, a vessel owned 
by American citizens which was being used to aid the Canadian insurgents, 
was, according to the British government, “a justifiable employment of 
force, for the purpose of defending the British Territory from the unpro-
voked attack of a band of British rebels and American pirates, who, having 
been ‘permitted’ to arm and organize themselves within the territory of the 
United States, had actually invaded a portion of the territory of Her Majes-
ty.”66 From the exchanges that followed, it is clear that while the United 
States took offense with the inference that it had allowed the rebels to use its 
territory from which to launch such attacks, it was equally concerned to 
distance itself from the conduct of the rebels with the statement that it was 
the President’s “fixed resolution that all such disturbers of the national 
peace, and violators of the laws of their country, shall be brought to exem-
plary punishment.”67   
The ILC’s determination that the Caroline case turned on the principle 
of necessity rather than self-defense merits being cited in full: 
 
In response to the protests by the United States, the British Minister in 
Washington, Fox, referred to the “necessity of self-defence and self-
preservation”; the same point was made by counsel consulted by the Brit-
ish Government, who stated that “the conduct of the British Authorities” 
was justified because it was “absolutely necessary as a measure of precau-
tion”. Secretary of State Webster replied to Minister Fox that “nothing 
less than a clear and absolute necessity can afford ground of justification” 
for the commission “of hostile acts within the territory of a Power at 
Peace”, and observed that the British Government must prove that the 
action of its forces had really been caused by “a necessity of self-defence, 
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
                                                                                                                      
66. Extract from note of April 24, 1841 from U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster 
to the British Government following an exchange with the British Minister in Washington, 
Mr. Fox, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2012). 












deliberation”. In his message to Congress of 7 December 1841, President 
Tyler reiterated that: 
 
“This Government can never concede to any foreign Government the 
power, except in a case of the most urgent and extreme necessity, of in-
vading its territory, either to arrest the persons or destroy the property of 
those who may have violated the municipal laws of such foreign Gov-
ernment.”  
 
The incident was not closed until 1842, with an exchange of letters in 
which the two Governments agreed that “a strong overpowering necessi-
ty may arise when this great principle may and must be suspended”. “It 
must be so”, added Lord Ashburton, the British Government’s ad hoc 
envoy to Washington, “for the shortest possible period during the con-
tinuance of an admitted overruling necessity, and strictly confined within 
the narrowest limits imposed by that necessity.”68 
 
Although the term “self-defence” appears in the exchanges between 
the parties, it is clear that each was referring to a state of necessity. What is 
more, the incident predated any limitation on the right of the use of force. 
Even though the Caroline case provides an exemplary example of necessity, 
the critical question is whether it is at all relevant in the post-Charter age.69 
Did the advent of the jus ad bellum regime with the express inclusion of Ar-
ticle 51 implicitly exclude necessity?  
Before addressing these questions, the criticisms directed at the ILC for 
its apparent ambivalence as to whether necessity is a justification or excuse 
merits some comment.70 To treat necessity as a justification is to suggest 
that the violation of the obligation owed by a State to another was, in the 
circumstances, not wrongful. If, on the other hand, necessity functions to 
excuse the State, no responsibility attaches for the violation although the 
act is recognized as wrongful. As commentators have observed, the differ-
ence between the two is of critical importance as legal consequences follow 
for victims (Is compensation in order?) and third parties (Are they entitled to inter-
vene?). Although distinguishing between justifications and excuses within 
the context of domestic criminal law offers practical benefits and can inject 
                                                                                                                      
68. CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 178, ¶ 5.  
69. In his dissenting opinion in the Corfu Channel case, Judge Krylov concluded, 
“[T]he so-called right of self-help, also known as the law of necessity (Notrecht) which 
used to be upheld by a number of German authors, can no longer be invoked. [In the 
post-Charter age] it must be regarded as obsolete.” Corfu Channel, supra note 27, at 77. 













greater clarity into notions of culpability, whether the same reasoning ap-
plies at the international level is another matter.71 The ILC’s decision to 
retain the phrase “circumstances precluding wrongfulness” and, in parallel, 
remain agnostic as to whether any of the listed circumstances functioned to 
justify or excuse, might be better regarded as a recognition of the particular 
way in which international law is constituted. Exculpation may indeed 
weaken the compliance pull exercised by a rule to a greater extent than an 
excuse,72 but there may be good reasons why on certain occasions a viola-
tion is regarded as justified. Since international law is an outcome of State 
practice, whether a circumstance serves to exculpate or excuse is a matter 
that is better treated on a case-by-case basis rather than through the impo-
sition of “one blanket solution.”73 To transplant a legal methodology from 
the domestic to the international without due regard for the fundamentally 
distinguishable structural relations upon which each is founded is, as Rob-
ert Sloane observes, a “perilous" exercise.74 Likewise, although the reason-
ing and conditions attached to the plea of necessity as it applies to States 
may be informed by the domestic experience, they should not be deter-
mined by it.   
 
A. The Prohibition on the Use of Force in a Post-Charter System   
 
To claim that the plea of necessity might be invoked to preclude responsi-
bility for a use of force under contemporary international law is a contro-
versial assertion. The predominant view is that the jus ad bellum regime in-
troduced by the UN Charter prohibited all uses of force save for the two 
codified exceptions. What is more, even if the plea of necessity cannot pre-
clude responsibility if the obligation violated is a peremptory norm. That 
the prohibition on the use of force as codified in Article 2(4) of the Charter 
is such a norm is widely accepted among international law experts.75 Terry 
                                                                                                                      
71. Contrary to popular opinion, distinguishing between justifications and excuses 
within criminal law is often not easy. In particular, the difficulty associated with categoriz-
ing necessity and duress is such that they may better be approached as hybrid defenses.    
72. Vaughan Lowe, Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: A Plea for Excuses, 10 EURO-
PEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 405, 410 (1999).  
73. Id. at 411. 
74. Sloane, supra note 58, at 473. 
75. See, e.g., CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 24 
(2000); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 2–3 (1999) (stating “the prohibition enunciated in 












Gill’s description of the prohibition as the “linchpin of the international 
legal system” is a commonly shared view, as is his observation that “alt-
hough subjected to differing interpretations by scholars, and violated on 
numerous occasions, it nevertheless remains an almost universally accepted 
fundamental rule of international law and relations, one widely recognized 
as having a jus cogens character.”76 To question the jus cogens status of the 
prohibition comes close to undermining the entire edifice upon which con-
temporary international law is founded. That said, if the prohibition is in-
deed a peremptory norm, any views that hold otherwise should be easy to 
dismiss.  
Overcoming these objections is admittedly difficult despite the rejec-
tion by the ILC and its Special Rapporteur, Robert Ago, of the suggestion 
that the express inclusion of the self-defense exception to the Article 2(4) 
prohibition in the Charter implicitly excluded the plea of necessity in all 
circumstances. Such a conclusion, it was maintained, did not “logically or 
necessarily” follow.77 Whether such a finding is sustainable today is another 
matter. The record over the last sixty years is that States have consistently 
invoked self-defense to justify any and all uses of force even when the fac-
tual circumstances would have supported a strong claim of necessity, as in 
many cases involving the “rescuing” of nationals and others from civil war 
or hostage situations. 
  The objection—that the jus cogens status of the prohibition on the use 
of force that precludes the applicability of necessity—presents less of an 
impediment. Despite the consensus among a majority of commentators 
that the prohibition is jus cogens, on closer inspection there is surprisingly 
little evidence in the shape of explicit declarations on the part of States to 
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support this view.78 Of course this does not mean that the prohibition is 
not part of customary international law and therefore not binding on all 
States. The State practice in support of its customary status is considerable. 
Nevertheless, whether the prohibition as codified in Article 2(4) stands up 
to scrutiny when assessed against the generally accepted criteria for identi-
fying a jus cogens norm demands consideration. This is a question that has 
received little attention given the significance of the outcome.79 Article 53 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a peremp-
tory norm of general international law as “a norm accepted and recognized 
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which 
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subse-
quent norm of general international law having the same character.” Since 
by definition, a jus cogens norm is generally accepted as one from which 
States may not derogate, the fact that the Article 2(4) prohibition is not an 
absolute rule but subject to a number of exceptions is problematic.  The 
complexity of this issue is alluded to by former ICJ Judge Rosalyn Higgins, 
who comments:  
 
In the Oil Platforms case, some judges viewed the application of norms re-
lating to the use of force as having this special [jus cogens] character, and 
for this reason among others, displacing the more obvious applicable law. 
It seems to me self-evident that the use of force, when it is prohibited in 
the circumstances of Article 2(4) of the Charter, but permitted in the cir-
cumstances of Article 51 of the Charter, is not a jus cogens provision that 
without more sets aside a different specific, applicable law.80  
 
As Linderfalk reveals, the application of the definition of jus cogens to 
the prohibition appears to produce an absurd outcome: “[T]he relevant jus 
cogens norm cannot possibly be identical with the principle of non-use of 
force as such. If it were, this would imply that whenever a State exercises a 
right of self-defence, it would in fact be unlawfully derogating from a norm 
of jus cogens.”81 To surmount the critics’ doubt as to the jus cogens status of 
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the prohibition thus requires redefining the prohibition by incorporating 
the exceptions into the rule. What is more, a comprehensive remedy would 
also require the conditions imposed by customary international law to be 
similarly integrated into the definition.82 The complexity of the challenge, 
coupled with the perpetually contested aspects of the right to use defensive 
force, has prompted some to question whether a jus cogens norm can exist 
when its scope and parameters for its application are so debated.83   
A further factor that weakens the norm’s jus cogens credentials is the un-
certainty that surrounds the very notion of what constitutes a use of force. 
Although Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force, no further definition or 
criteria are provided under the Charter to determine when an act amounts 
to a use of force.84 What is now widely accepted is that uses of force can be 
differentiated. This was expressly recognized by the ICJ in the Nicaragua 
judgment when it distinguished the uses of force that are “most grave”—
those constituting an “armed attack”—from other, less grave forms of 
force.85 Six years earlier, the ILC had raised this very question in the con-
text of whether necessity could be invoked in situations involving uses of 
force that were not, by definition, in violation of a peremptory norm. Alt-
hough there was unanimity that a use of force within the meaning of “ag-
gression” would unambiguously violate a peremptory norm (thereby pre-
cluding the applicability of necessity) the more pertinent question was 
whether necessity could be invoked in situations that involved uses of force 
short of aggression if not all uses of force were peremptory in nature.86  
A survey of State practice, at least until 1980, proved ambiguous, lead-
ing the ILC and its then–Special Rapporteur, Roberto Ago, to conclude 
that no definitive conclusions could be drawn. It therefore remained unset-
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tled as to whether States were barred from invoking necessity in respect of 
all uses of force because, by definition, all are jus cogens prohibitions. This 
impasse of sorts was “resolved” by distinguishing between primary and 
secondary rules, allowing Ago to reason that since the ILC had been tasked 
to identify the applicable secondary rules, it was up to other organs charged 
with interpreting the primary rules to determine whether a differentiation 
could be made.87 Finding Ago’s reasoning persuasive, in its 1980 report the 
ILC also deferred judgment on the matter but nevertheless concurred with 
the Special Rapporteur’s assessment that the question might arise as to 
whether a state of necessity could be invoked to justify an infringement of 
the territorial sovereignty of a State in circumstances where the violation 
need not necessarily be considered as an act of aggression or breach of a jus 
cogens obligation.88  
According to the Commission, a distinction could be drawn for “cer-
tain actions by States in the territory of other States which, although they 
may sometimes be of a coercive nature, serve only limited intentions and 
purposes bearing no relation to the purposes characteristic of a true act of 
aggression.”89 More specifically, this could include: 
 
Some incursions into foreign territory to forestall harmful operations by 
an armed group which was preparing to attack the territory of the State, 
or in pursuit of an armed band or gang of criminals who had crossed the 
frontier and perhaps had their base in that foreign territory, or to protect 
the lives of nationals or other persons attacked or detained by hostile 
forces or groups not under the authority and control of the State, or to 
eliminate or neutralize a source of troubles which threatened to occur or 
to spread across the frontier.90  
 
By 1999, the question of whether uses of force could be “differentiat-
ed” had become a particularly pressing matter in the context of the military 
action in Kosovo and the ensuing debates on humanitarian intervention. 
Endorsing his predecessor’s reasoning, the newly appointed Special Rap-
                                                                                                                      
87. Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 77, ¶ 66. The Special Rapporteur did, 
however, note that to claim that all uses of force are prohibited jus cogens “might be to ex-
pand beyond what is at present accepted by the legal conviction of States, either the con-
cept of ‘aggression’ or the concept of a ‘peremptory norm’ as defined in article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.” Id., ¶ 59. 
88. 1980 Report of the ILC, supra note 63, at 43–44, ¶ 23.  
89. Id. at 44. 












porteur, James Crawford, concluded that the question of whether the use 
of force in certain circumstances was lawful was not a matter that fell with-
in the scope of the secondary rules.91 But despite the Special Rapporteur’s 
repeated emphasis that it was not the function of the Commission to inter-
pret the Charter provisions on the use of force, in his discussions on per-
emptory norms and humanitarian intervention, Crawford is clearly of the 
view that “the rules relating to the use of force referred to in Articles 2(4) 
and 51 of the Charter” rank among the “peremptory norms of internation-
al law.”92 The Special Rapporteur’s insistence on maintaining a distinction 
between primary and secondary rules—thereby avoiding the fracas over 
humanitarian intervention—simply did not extend to the prohibition on 
the use of force as codified in Article 2(4) which was assumed to be a “per-
emptory norm.”93  
The final draft of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility avoids all 
reference to the contentious question as to whether all uses of force are jus 
cogens. Nevertheless, fears that the inclusion of a list of circumstances that 
functioned to preclude wrongfulness would create a loophole led the 
Commission to include Article 26 (“Compliance with peremptory norms”). 
In that article, the Commission reaffirms that none of the listed circum-
stances can preclude the wrongfulness of an act which is not in conformity 
with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm. Conceding that few 
peremptory norms have been recognized by the international community 
as meeting the criteria set forth in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion, the Commission concludes that those peremptory norms that are 
clearly accepted include “the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, 
racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture, and the right to 
self-determination.”94 The absence of any reference to the prohibition on 
the use of force has left commentators to differ on what conclusions might 
be drawn.  
While all uses of force are prohibited under treaty and customary inter-
national law, apart from the two codified exceptions, it is difficult to defini-
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tively conclude that all such prohibitions have acquired the status of a jus 
cogens prohibition.95 However, even if a distinction in uses of force can be 
sustained, surmounting the argument that the plea of necessity involving a 
use of force did not survive the Charter regime remains hugely problematic. 
This raises the question as to whether necessity can or should be revived as 
an exception by virtue of a primary rule and, if so, what conditions might 
attach to best guard against abuse. 
 
B. The Conditions Attached to the Doctrine of Necessity 
 
Insofar as the acting State is concerned, invoking necessity implies perfect 
awareness of having deliberately chosen to act in a manner not in conformi-
ty with an international obligation.96 Since the decision to violate the obliga-
tion must have been the “only way” to avert the threat, there is no room 
for a State wishing to rely on the plea to claim that the conduct chosen was 
the preferred option among other available options that would not have 
entailed a breach of the obligation. It is likely that most pleas based on ne-
cessity will be rejected at this stage. This particular condition of the necessi-
ty plea parallels the necessity requirement that attaches to self-defense in 
that it would be impermissible for the acting State to resort to force if oth-
er options to effectively address the threat are available. Take, for example, 
the incursions by Turkey into northern Iraq. There is an arguable case that 
since Iraq was unable to prevent the PKK from launching attacks from its 
territory given the existence of the no-fly zone, the only way that Turkey 
could avert further attacks was to take matters into its own hands which 
necessarily involved the violation of Iraq’s territorial sovereignty. Whether 
Turkey’s military operations fulfilled the remaining conditions of necessity 
so as to conclude that its responsibility for violating the obligation it owed 
to Iraq was precluded is another matter.     
The use of the word “essential” by the ILC to denote what interests 
might be protected by the violation of an obligation has been criticized for 
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being too broad in scope. The Commission’s decision in 1980 that “it 
would be pointless to try to spell out any more clearly and to lay down pre-
established categories of interests”97 on the ground that such matters were 
invariably context-dependent was a view from which the ILC did not de-
part in the final draft. By way of example, in both 1980 and 2001, the ILC 
suggested that such interests might include preserving the existence of the 
State itself, its political or economic survival, the maintenance of conditions 
in which its essential services can function, the keeping of its internal 
peace, the survival of part of its population, and the ecological preservation 
of all or some of its territory.98 Although these interests are admittedly 
broad in nature, it is only when the interest identified is threatened by a 
“grave and imminent” peril that the condition is satisfied. To return to the 
case of Turkey, unless compelling evidence of a grave and imminent attack 
by the PKK could have been demonstrated, it is unlikely that Turkey 
would have been able to rely on the plea. Other cases cannot be so easily 
dismissed, including Lebanon in 2006 and Afghanistan in 2001.  
In addition to posing a serious threat to the interest identified, the peril 
must be “objectively established”; in other words, the possibility of a threat 
to the interest does not suffice. This does not mean that uncertainty as to 
the future disqualifies a State from invoking the plea but what is required is 
for the threat to be “clearly established on the basis of the evidence reason-
ably available at the time.”99 Moreover, the peril must be imminent in the 
sense of “proximate.”100 This raises an important question concerning tem-
porality. As with self-defense, once the peril or threat no longer exists, 
there is no basis upon which the State can continue to rely on the plea. A 
State that resorts to force on the territory of another therefore cannot con-
tinue to invoke necessity once the threat no longer exists.    
A further condition for invoking necessity is that the conduct in ques-
tion must not seriously impair an essential interest of the other State or 
States concerned, or of the international community as a whole. This con-
dition, as Sloane has observed, requires a balancing analysis that is akin to 
the choice-of-evils paradigm found in domestic criminal law. Sloane’s con-
cern that this assumes “values and interests can, in principle, be ranked or-
dinarily in a normative hierarchy” 101 is not, as he infers, one that is limited 
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to the arena of international law. At the municipal level the lesser harm test 
has never satisfactorily explained how an objective comparison can be 
made of harms that are plainly not quantifiable or where the values being 
compared are manifestly incommensurable because qualitatively so differ-
ent. The lesser harm test is sometimes equated to the proportionality test 
although the former sets a higher threshold. The ILC decision to opt for 
the lesser-harm test therefore corresponds with its overall ambition to limit 
the applicability of the plea.  
The fact that the interest relied on must “outweigh all other considera-
tions, not merely from the point of view of the acting State but on a rea-
sonable assessment of the competing interests, whether these are individual 
or collective,” injects into the assessment a critical element of objectivity, 
including the requirement to consider obligations erga omnes.102 This particu-
lar condition will severely curtail a State’s ability to resort to force since the 
threat must be very substantial to outweigh all other considerations. The 
threat would certainly have to go beyond “acts of a sporadic character that 
cause occasional harm and inconvenience”103 since the two rules being vio-
lated form the cornerstone of the international legal system—namely, the 
prohibition on the use of force and the principle of territorial sovereignty. 
For the threat to reach the required level of gravity, it is doubtful that a pat-
tern of attacks will suffice. Although the ICJ has not entirely dismissed the 
“accumulation of events” theory in the context of self-defense, it is doubt-
ful that the same reasoning can apply in the case of necessity.104 This is be-
cause, as Andreas Laursen opines, to respond to a systemic threat with an 
exceptional ad hoc response is conceptually an “oxymoron.”105 
It is not uncommon in domestic criminal law for a defendant to be 
precluded from relying on the plea of necessity by what is sometimes re-
ferred to as the doctrine of prior fault. In other words a defendant cannot 
rely on necessity if he or she has contributed to the situation. At the munic-
ipal level, the doctrine serves two purposes: to restrict the availability of the 
plea and to reaffirm the centrality of moral choice above any expansive de-
terministic claims which would undermine the very substance of the crimi-
nal justice system.  Article 25(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility pre-
cludes necessity if the State has “contributed to the situation of necessity.” 
The purpose of this condition may be simply to limit even further the 
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availability of the necessity plea. Nevertheless, this particular condition sits 
uneasily within the broader understanding of necessity as a circumstance 
that precludes wrongfulness on the part of States.     
This cursory review of the conditions that attach to necessity indicates 
that it is a plea with limited application.  The stringent cumulative condi-
tions that will need to be met are likely to severely restrict its applicability. 




As a matter of legal reasoning, and in contrast to self-defense, necessity 
offers a far more coherent basis upon which to justify the extraterritorial 
use of force against members of organized armed groups where the con-
sent of the territorial State is not forthcoming. Although the stringent cu-
mulative conditions that apply to the plea of necessity mean that it is likely 
to be available only under “certain very limited conditions,”106 the anxiety 
that the plea engenders nevertheless remains entrenched. A partial explana-
tion for this is that necessity poses two particular problems for liberal theo-
ry. First, because it has the potential to “validate decisions according to 
conscience or prejudice rather than according to law,”107 necessity threatens 
liberalism’s uncompromising fidelity to the rule of law. Second, by blurring 
the line between legislative, executive, and judicial responsibilities necessity 
seems to condone self-exemption which liberalism cannot tolerate. That 
said, the intuitive resistance to recognizing the plea in circumstances in-
volving the use of force may be misplaced. Allowing for the plea in excep-
tional situations would extend to States an effective remedy which would 
be governed by, and judged according to, the legal criteria established by 
the plea. Critically, this would also provide an opportunity to reclaim the 
inter-State interpretation of Article 51 and make better sense of the ICJ’s 
insistence that an armed attack within the meaning of the article is limited 
to situations in which there has been substantial involvement of a State.  
The plea of necessity may enable a State, in very exceptional circum-
stances, to cross a border lawfully but the State will also be required to 
comply with other relevant bodies of law before its conduct is regarded as 
lawful. In some situations this will entail having to respect relevant human 
rights obligations, while other situations will be governed by the jus in bello.   
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Circumstances that give rise to a plea of necessity will be exceedingly 
rare. The use of force on the territory of Afghanistan in respect of Al 
Qaeda in 2001 is perhaps one such case. Paradoxically, international law 
scholars who attempted to make sense of the law in the immediate wake of 
9/11 showcased the Caroline case as a precedent for invoking self-defense 
against non-State actors. The Caroline case was the relevant precedent, on 
the basis not of self-defense, but rather of necessity. Over a decade on, 
there seems little point in revising history but that does not mean that les-
sons cannot be learned from past mistakes.  
 
 
